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BULK SALES LAWS: A STUDY IN ECONOMIC
ADJUSTMENT I
THOMAS CLIFFORD BILLIG
Joseph Johnson operates a men's clothing store in a rented
storeroom along Market Street in the town of X. He has a stock
of goods valued in his property statement at $3ooo. Harry Jack-
son, credit manager for the T supply house, extends Johnson
credit and fills his orders up to $iooo. Ten days after these
goods have been delivered, Jackson learns that Johnson has sold
out his business "lock, stock, and barrel" to Fred Brown for
$2oo0, has invested the money in an automobile, and has left in
the car for an undisclosed destination. An investigation reveals
that Johnson has no other assets than the automobile, and that, at
the time of the transfer of the stock of goods, Johnson gave
Brown positive assurance that the business was free from debt.
On the statute books of the forty-eight states there are en-
actments describing, sometimes in great detail, the conditions
which both Johnson and his vendee must meet before the former
legally can transfer his stock of goods in bulk. While these stat-
utes vary as regards specific provisions, four general types have
been evolved.
2
I. The so-called "New York form" has been the model for
the bulk sales statutes in thirty-three jurisdictions.3 This type of
' This article was prepared under the supervision of Professor Walter F.
Dodd, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree-of Doctor of
Legal Science at Yale University.
2 MoNTG0mEoRY, LAWS AND DECISIONS APPLYING TO SALES IN BULK (2d
ed. 1926) 13.
3AALA. CIV. CODE (1923) §§8o41-8045; ARK. DIG. STAT. (Supp. 1927)
§§ 4870-4872; CoLO. CoMP. LAWS (1921) §§ 3756-3758; DEL. REV. CODE (1915)
§2638; ILL REV. STAT. (Cahill, 1923) 3025; IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1926)
§§ 8052-8054; IOWA CODE (1924) §§ 10008-10012; KAN. REV. STAT. ANN.
(1923) C. 58, §§ 101-104; ME. REV. STAT. (1916) c. 114, §6; MASS. GEN. LAWS
(1921) c. io6, §§ I, 2; 2 MICH. CoMP. LAWS (1915) §§ 6346-6348; MINN. GEN.
STAT. (1923) §§8473-8474; Miss. ANN. CODE (Hemingway, 1927) §§3335-
3338; Mo. REv. STAT. (1919) §§2286-2290; NEB. COMP. STAT. (1922) §§256x-
2562; N. H. PUB. LAWS (1926) 840; N. J. COMP. STAT. (Cune. Supp. 1924)
§§ 18o-182; N. M. ANN. STAT. (1915) §§ 4804-4806, as amended, Laws of 1915,
c. 22; N. Y. CoNs. LAws (Cahill, 1923) C. 42, § 44; N. C. CODE ANN. (1927)
§ 1013; I N. D. Coiip. LAWS (1913) §§ 7224-7227; OHIO GEN. CODE (Page,
1926) §§11,102-11,103-1; 2 OKLA. COMP. STAT. (1921) §§6o27-6o3o; R. I.
(72)
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enactment usually provides that the sale, transfer, or assignment
in bulk of the whole or any part of a stock of merchandise, or
(in the event of a sale made outside of the ordinary course of
trade) of such merchandise and fixtures used in the business-
shall be void as against the creditors of the seller or assignor
unless certain conditions are complied with. These are that a
detailed inventory of the stock and its cost price must be made at
least five days- before the transfer; that the purchaser or assignee
must receive from the seller or assignor a sworn statement list-
ing his creditors and the amount owing each; and that the pur-
chaser or assignee must notify these creditors, either personally or
by registered mail, at least five days before the transfer, as to the
price, terms, and conditions of the proposed sale. Assignments
for the benefit of creditors are exempt from provisions of these
statutes, as are sales by judicial and fiduciary officers and by as-
signees for the benefit of creditors. Any purchaser or assignee
who fails to conform to the requirements of the statute, upon
the application of any creditor of the seller, becomes a receiver
for the creditors and is held accountable to the latter for all mer-
chandise and fixtures which have come into his hands.
2. A type of statute known as.the "Pennsylvania form" is
much more comprehensive in scope, and is the one most favored
at the present time by the outstanding proponents of bulk sales
legislation. 4  Eleven states have modelled their bulk sales laws
along its lines.5 The principal provisions of the New York form
are included, although ten days' notice to creditors, instead of
GEN. LAWS (1923) §§ 4503-4504; 3 S. C. CoDE OF LAWS (1922) §§ 3527-3529;
S. D. REV. ConE (1919) §§ 914--921; TENN. ANN. CODE (Shannon, 1917)
§§3xI8a-65-3Ii8a-67; Tnx. REV. CIV. STAT. (1925) arts. 4001-4003; VT. GEN.
LAWS (1917) §§ 6o13-6o4; VA. CODE ANN. (1919) § 5187, as amended, Laws of
1926, 598; W. VA. CODE (Barnes, 1923) c. 74, § 3a, as amended, Acts of 1921,
c. 1O8; WIs. STAT. (925) §§24r.i8-1412I; WYo. COMP. STAT. ANN. (1920)
C. 302.
' See Montgomery, The Bulk Sales Law as It Was Intended to Be and as
It Is (1923) 25 CREDIT MONTHLY 8. The new Louisiana Bulk Sales Law of
1926 follows generally the "Pennsylvania form." See note 36, infra.
ID. C. ANN. CODE (Torbert, 1919) 457; 2 FLA. REV. GEN. STAT. (1920)
§§ 3865-3868, 5200; GA. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1926) §§ 3226-3229; 2 IDAHO
CoMP. STAT. (1919) §§ 5752-5756; Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1922) §§ 265ia-I-
265ia-7; Acts of La. 1926, 464; 3 MD. ANN. CODE (914) §§ 100-103; 4 MD.
ANN. CODE (914) § 104; NEv. REv. LAW (1912) § 3908; 2 OR. LAWS (Olson,
192o) §§ 8x61-8i64; PA. STAT. (West, 192o) §§ 784-791; UTAH Comp. LAWS
(97) §§ 5103-sIo7.
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five, are required. In addition the Pennsylvania form sets forth
the form of certificate of indebtedness to which the seller must
make affidavit. If the act is not complied with, the transaction is
"fraudulent and void," rather than void. The purchaser also is
required to see that the proceeds of the sale are applied to the
debts of the seller. A wilful false statement by the seller to the
purchaser is made a misdemeanor. The creditors of the vendor
may waive the protection of the act, and a ninety-day limitation
is imposed upon those who would take advantage of the statute.
3. Montana 6 has passed a bulk sales law which resembles the
Pennsylvania act, and includes many of its provisions. How-
ever, under this Montana statute, the purchaser is not required to
give notice of the contemplated sale to the creditors of his vendor.
4. In Connecticut 7 a bulk sales law very limited in scope has
been enacted. Only those vendors who are engaged in the busi-
ness of buying commodities and selling the same "in small quan-
tities for the purpose of making a profit" are included within its
provisions. Barber shops, dental parlors, restaurants, and shoe-
shining and hat-cleaning shops are mentioned specifically as within
its scope. The proposed transfer must be recorded "in the town
clerk's office of the town in which such business was being con-
ducted" at least fourteen days before the sale, but no personal
notice to the seller's creditors is required. Arizona 8 follows the
"Connecticut form," as do California I and Washington,'0 "al-
though in the two latter jurisdictions the operation of the act is
not limited to those buying and selling commodities in small quan-
tities" only." As amended in 1926, the Washington statute also
includes provisions similar to those found in the Montana and
the Pennsylvania acts.
Although a statute modelled after one of the foregoing
forms is now in force in every American jurisdiction, thirty-five
years ago no such bulk sales legislation existed. Why then have
'2 MONT. REv. CODES (Choate, 1921) §§86o7-86II.
7 2 CONN. GEN. STAT. (1918) §§4749-4751.
'ARIZ. CIV. CODE (1913) 99 5249-5250, as amended, Laws of 1915, c. 42.
'CAL. CODES AND GEN. LAWS (Supp. 1927) § 3440.
"WASH. CoMP. STAT. (Supp. 1927) §§ 5832-5836.
" MONTGOMERY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 16.
BULK SALES LAWS
our state legislatures, within a relatively short period, seen fit
to give their unanimous approval to these enactments, and is Dean
Pound's assertion correct that "credit men's associations have
procured laws against the sale of stocks in bulk"? 12 Is this a
case where the economic interpretation of law is the correct one,
and where "organized pressure from groups having a common
economic interest" 13 is the "sole explanation" 14 for the exist-
ence of specific legislation which otherwise might never have
been passed?
This paper will discuss the foregoing questions under three
main heads: (i) the need for bulk sales legislation; (2) the cam-
paign for bulk sales legislation, with its results; and (3) the con-
stitutionality of bulk sales legislation.
THE NEED FOR BULK SALES LEGIsLATIoN
Conditions in the late nineties are thus described by J. Harry
Tregoe,15 first president of the National Association of Credit
Men, and at the present time one of this country's outstanding fig-
ures in the field of credit: 16
"A favorite indoor sport of three decades ago with the
fraudulently inclined debtor was to sell his stock in bulk,
pocket the proceeds and laugh at his creditors. There was
no way of reaching the debtor along criminal lines if he had
broken no law, and the game could be played without fear of
punishment whenever the debtor felt the urge of the deceit-
ful method."
Is this quoted statement merely the reaction of one who saw
through the eyes of the so-called creditor class? 17 Or was this
"indoor sport" a prevalent evil before the days of bulk sales
statutes?
I POUND, INTERPETATION OF LEGAL HISTORY (1923) 113.
3Ibid.
u Ibid.
'- From 1912 to 1927 Mr. Tregoe served as executive manager of the Na-
tional Association of Credit Men. At present he heads the Tregoe Economic
Organization, with headquarters in Los Angeles, California.
"- (927) 29 CREDIT MONTHLY 1I, 12.
27 Some credit men of the period were most vigorous in their denunciation of
dishonest retailers and their accomplices: "I do not believe that it is possible
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The state reports from about 189o to 19o3-the period of
greatest agitation for bulk sales laws-are filled with decisions
which involve the transfer by a tradesman of his entire stock in
gross, without making proper provision for his creditors. 18 As
only a small fraction of the actual cases ever reached the appel-
late courts, there is little question but that creditors of the period
did face a widespread practice which placed them at the mercy
of dishonestly inclined debtors. 9
to legislate a thief into an honest man, but I do believe that it is possible to
frame a law that will place almost insurmountable barriers in the way of that
danmable class of pirates who swoop down upon a peaceful and confiding com-
munity and levant between two suns. And what is more they take with them
a clear title to their ill-gotten gains, leaving behind a broken faith in the
honesty of mankind, and sometimes also there is left behind one of those
creatures who sleeps in the ecstatic security of always having his fingers
crossed-that rare individual, the conceited credit man." From an address of
retiring President Alexis C. Foster, of the Denver Association of Credit Men,
delivered October 14, 19o2, reported in (Nov. 5, 1902) Bu.Lr=N NATIONAL
AssoCIATIoN OF CREDIT MEN.
' Nelms v. Steiner Bros., II3 Ala. 562, 22 So. 435 (897); Chipman v.
Glennon, 98 Ala. 263, 13 So. 822 (x892) ; Carl & Tobey Co. v. Beal & Fletcher
Co., 64 Ark. 373, 42 S. W. 664 (1897); Milling v. Hillenbrand, 56 Ill. App.
3o6 (1894) ; Carter & Co. v. Richardson & Co., 22 Ky. L. Rep. 1204, 6o S. W.
397 (IpoI); Edgewood Distilling Co. v. Nowland, ig Ky. L. Rep. 174o, 44 S.
W. 364 (1898); Hirsch v. Fudicker, 43 La. Ann. 886, 9 So. 742 (i89I); Bliss
v. Crosier, 159 Mass. 498, 34 N. E. IO75 (1893); Killam v. Pierce, 153 Mass.
502, 27 N. E. 520 (I891); Schloss v. Estey, i114 Mich. 429, 72 N. W. 264
(1899); Pollock v. Butler, 23 So. 577 (Miss. 1898); Wilkerson v. Moffett-
West Drug Co., 74 Miss. 499, 21 So. 564 (1897); John Deere Plow Co. v.
Sullivan, I58 Mo. 440, 59 S. W. 1005 (1900); St. Louis Brewing Assn. v.
Steinke, 68 Mo. App. 52 (1896); Beels v. Flynn, 28 Neb. 575, 44 N. W. 732
(189o) ; Fisher v. Stout, 74 App. Div. 97, 77 N. Y. Supp. 945 (I902) ; Moyer
v. Bloomingdale, 38 App. Div. 227, 56 N. Y. Supp. 991 (1899) ; King v. Sim-
mons, 36 App. Div. 623, 55 N. Y. Supp. 173 (1898) ; Blumenthal v. Michel, 33
App. Div. 636, 54 N. Y. Supp. 8i (1898); Ross v. Caywood, i6 App. Div.
591, 44 N. Y. Supp. 985 (1897) ; Rheinfelt v. Dahlman, ig Misc. i6, 43 N. Y.
Supp. 281 (1897); Wheeler v. Giddens, 59 S. W. I8I (Tenn. Ch. i9oo);
Gierse & Co. v. Whitehurst, 66 Tex. 244, i8 S. W. 340 (i886); Yerby v.
Martin, 38 S. W. 541 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897); Amsden v. Fitch & Enricht, 67
Vt. 522, 32 AtI. 478 (I895).
"Jurists as well as credit men, considered the evil which the bulk sales
statutes sought to remedy a widespread one.
"Prior to the passage of the law it was a common practice for retailers to
sell their stock of goods in bulk, pay no one, and leave the man who sold them
the goods without recourse. Such practices became so disastrous to the whole-
salers that they were driven to the necessity of procuring legislation which
would afford them protection against unscrupulous retail merchants. The bulk
sales law is the result." Coleman, C. J., in Escalle v. Mark, 43 Nev. 172, 177,
183 Pac. 387, 389 (1919).
"This criticism of the statute is sought to be answered by the plea that
the law was designed to correct a great public evil, that it was aimed at a class
of merchants who have engaged in the fraudulent practice of obtaining mer-
chandise on credit for the purpose of making hasty and secret sales thereof in
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The panic of 1893 proved disastrous to those retailers who
had stocked up with goods at pre-panic prices, especially in the
agricultural communities, and the temptation was great to un-
load for even a small percentage of the original cost of the mer-
chandise. In the two years prior to April, 1899, at which time
Minnesota passed a bulk sales law, at least seven cases, each in-
volving the transfer of an entire stock in trade without provision
for the vendor's creditors, reached the Supreme Court of that
state.20  Iowa was suffering from an epidemic of "curbstone"
real-estate dealers. These operators, by advertising in the news-
papers that they had improved farms to trade for stocks of goods,
would get in touch with merchants whose financial condition was
critical and who naturally would be attracted to an advertisement
which offered a farm in exchange for merchandise. These real-
estate men were of the "fly-by-night" class and nine times out of
ten the farm offered would be heavily mortgaged. However, by
persuasion and the inducement of a small cash payment in addi-
tion to the farm (with perhaps the aid of a local banker who
"stood in" to get part of the cash either as his. commission, or as
payment on one of his own claims against the merchant), the
merchant would be prevailed upon to make the trade. The real-
estate operator then would move the goods to the next town and
hold a "forced sale," while the merchant would have nothing left
upon which his creditors could get execution, save the encum-
bered farm.
2 1
In Oregon the problem was especially acute because of the
unsettled nature of the country. Credit men report that it was
bulk and then decamping with, or otherwise disposing of, the proceeds at the
expense of their creditors. It may be conceded that this was the ostensible pur-
pose of the statute, and that the evil complained of was of substantial reality
and magnitude, for which an efficacious remedy was much to be desired."
Werner, J., in Wright v. Hart, 182 N. Y. 330, 336, 75 N. E. 404, 4o6 (igoS).
' Manwaring v. O'Brien, 75 Minn. 542, 78 N. W. i (Feb, 2, x899) ; Benson
v. Nash, 75 Mirn. 341, 77 N. W. 991 (Jan. 24, 1899); Benton v. Minneapolis
Tailoring & Mfg. Co., 73 Minn. 498,76 N. W. 265 (Aug. 4, 1898) ; Bruggemann
v. Wagener, 72 Mim. 329, 75 N. W. 230 (May 2o, x898); Brown v. Scheffer,
72 Minn. 27, 74 N. W. 9o2 (Apr. 22, 1898); McCarvel v. Wood, 68 Minn. IO4,
70 N. W. 871 (Apr. 30, 1897) ; Mix v. Edge, 67 Minn. 116, 69 N. W. 703 (Jan.
4, 1897).
'Address of R. 0. Green, Fort Dodge, Iowa, before Des Moines Associa-
tion of Credit Men, (Sept. i9o8) BULL-rN NATIONAL AssocIATIoN OF CREDIT
MEN 648, 65o.
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customary for an itinerant merchant to lease a storeroom and fix-
tures, stock up with goods bought on credit, and then sell out "in
bulk." As quickly as the purchase price was paid, the "tramp
merchant" would leave for another location, and soon would be
operating again along similar lines.
22
Carter & Co. v. Richardson & Co.,23 a Kentucky decision in
I9OI, furnishes a typical illustration of practices current at that
time. This case, as do most in this group, grew out of a writ of
attachment sought by a creditor of the vendor against a stock of
goods transferred in bulk and in the hands of the vendee. Cohn,
the seller, was a merchant in Bowling Green who owned goods
worth upwards of $6ooo. About $2ooo in stock had been pur-
chased during the summer of 1895 on credits due to expire from
October 15th to November Ist. In the early part of October an
agent of the defendants appeared in Bowling Green and pur-
chased the entire stock of goods for cash at about 5o per cent
of its value, Cohn disappearing the same night. Next day the
agent packed up the stock and moved it through the back door of
the storeroom to a freight car. Here the creditor attached the
goods. And it is at this point that the courts began to play a
part in the solution of the problem.
Under such circumstances as those related, the court labored
under the handicap of not having an adequate common law rem-
edy for the protection of the creditor. The common law went on
the theory that one having possession of certain chattels, unen-
cumbered, was privileged to sell them regardless of the fact that
the possessor might still owe all or a considerable part of the pur-
chase price to his vendor. The Statute of 13 Elizabeth, adopted
in most of the American states, afforded relief to an unpaid credi-
tor of the seller, but only upon the theory that the buyer had par-
ticipated in the fraudulent act of his vendor by purchasing the
chattel with knowledge that the seller's creditors would suffer.
Thus, where the buyer had paid valuable consideration for .the
stock of goods, it was necessary for the creditor to show a "mu-
= Letter to the writer, June 4, 1928, from William B. Layton, Portland,
Ore., counsel for the Portland Association of Credit Men.
' Supra note 18.
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tual fraudulent intent" 24 on the part of the contracting parties
in order to have the transaction declared void. The creditor,
necessarily, was always under a heavy burden, because "fraud
works in secret," 25 and because the evidence necessary to un-
cover the "furtive scheme must, as a rule, be drawn from hostile
witnesses, usually relatives or intimate friends of the seller, who
took part in the fraud and shared in the plunder." 26
In the Carter case, however, the Kentucky court held that
as the fraud of Cohn, the vendor, was unquestionable, and as the
circumstances were such as to put the agent of the vendee upon
notice of such intent, those facts, coupled with the inadequacy of
the consideration, were enough to remove the vendee from the
category of a bona fide purchaser. Therefore, the attachment
writ was allowed to lie.
Those courts which strove hardest to protect the creditor did
so by finding the sale mutually fraudulent whenever possible.
Rombauer, P. J., thus described the "badges of fraud" in the
Missouri case of St. Louis Brewing Assn. v. Steimke,2 7 decided
in 1896:
"It will be seen that there was substantial evidence of
the following facts which might be considered by the jury as
badges of fraud. Undue and unusual haste in the transac-
tion of purchase. The purchase of the contents of a store in
lump without detailed inventory and appraisement and with-
out any satisfactory explanation why the goods were neither
inventoried nor appraised. Gross inadequacy of price."
In Beels v. Flynn,28 decided in I89O, Maxwell, J., speaking
for the Nebraska court, remarked:
"A purchaser cannot close his eyes to the circumstances
under which a debtor sells his goods-his entire stock. If
he buys at a considerable discount and the effect of his pro-
12 R. C. L. 533-536.
-Vann, J., in dissenting opinion to Wright v. Hart, 182 N. Y. 330, 346,
75 N. E. 404, 410 (I9O5).
" Ibid.
=Supra note 18, at 56.
" Supra note 18, at 581, 44 N. W. at 732.
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posed means of payment must be to hinder and delay, if not
defraud, creditors of the seller, the purchaser will buy at his
peril."
The Minnesota court in 1899, by Collins, J., likewise placed
upon the vendee a heavy burden in Manwaring v. O'Brien: 2 9
"Fraud is rarely susceptible of direct proof and may be
presumed from circumstances. Nor, in a case of this kind, is
it necessary to prove that an alleged party to the fraud, such
as a vendee, actually participated therein, or that he had
actual notice of his vendor's fraudulent intent. Where the
vendee has knowledge of such facts as would lead the ordi-
nary prudent man, using ordinary caution, to make inquiries,
whereby the fraudulent intent would have been discovered,
he cannot be deemed a bona fide purchaser of property."
Such then was the state of the law governing the transfer of
stocks of goods in bulk during the closing years of the Nineteenth
Century. Only if a conspicuous "badge of fraud" could be af-
fixed to the vendee by the creditor did the latter win. However,
as the above cases show, some courts went far in finding this
fraudulent intent on the part of the buyer. If the sale was made
suddenly, without inventory, and especially if the price paid was
inadequate, the court would scrutinize the transaction closely. And
if the vendee failed to make the inquiries ordinarily incidental to
a purchase of the kind, at least one court, Minnesota, made such
omission virtually equivalent to a presumption of fraudulent in-
tent on the part of the buyer. But, notwithstanding all this, in
numerous cases,30 although the seller might be intent on defraud-
ing his creditors, the buyer proved himself a bona fide purchaser,
free from all knowledge, actual or constructive, of the seller's
debts. And so the creditor went without a remedy. The addi-
tional fact that there was no national bankruptcy act in effect until
1898, and that each state was administering its own insolvency
laws, placed another stumbling block in the path of creditors.
' Supra note 20, at 545, 78 N. W. at 2.
' See cases supra note i8.
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THE CAMPAIGN FOR BULK SALES LEGIsLATION
While great need existed for legislation to supplement the
common law remedies of the late nineties; it is extremely doubtful
if the state legislatures, upon their own initiative, would have
rushed pell-mell to the aid of the creditor class. However, in the
decade from 1894 to 19o4, at least a score of states passed "bulk
bills" (as they were then called) which placed stringent require-
ments upon any retailer who would dispose of his stock of mer-
chandise in gross, as well as upon his transferee. And behind
these various state enactments lies the story of one of the most
highly organized, and thoroughly efficient, nation-wide lobbying
campaigns ever conducted in the interests of one economic group.
That group consisted of the credit department representatives of
business houses scattered all over the United States, who were
bound together in an organization called the National Association
of Credit Men.
The Louisiana Bulk Sales Act of i8 9 6 is regarded as the
pioneer statute of its kind.31 However, two years earlier, during
the session of 1894, the Louisiana legislature passed a bill "to de-
fine and punish certain misdemeanors in trade and commerce." 32
Section 2 of that act provided that "whosoever shall purchase
goods, wares or merchandise or other commodity on credit and
shall sell, hypothecate, or dispose of the same out of the usual
course of business and with the intent to cheat or defraud the
seller or vendor, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. "
Section 3 provided that "whosoever shall purchase any goods,
wares or merchandise, or other commodity on credit and shall
secrete himself, or abscond from the state for the purpose, and
with the intent of cheating or defrauding the seller or vendor,
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
This statute, which thus attempted to remedy the evil by
making the defrauding vendor or absconding vendee criminally
responsible, was drawn by a New Orleans attorney at the request
of a group of local credit men. 33 The New Orleans Credit Men's
' MONTGOMERY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 9.
Acts of La. 1894, 205.
= Letter to the writer, May 31, 1928, from Major T. J. Bartlette, manager of
the New Orleans Credit Men's Association, who was one of the sponsors of the
bill.
82 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
Association had not organized at that date, and, in fact, did not
receive its first charter until 1896. As the Act of 1894 was found
"to be defective," 34 the newly-born credit association succeeded
in having it amended in I896.31
This amended Statute of 1896, by eliminating the words
"or other commodity" from the Act of 1894, confined the chattels
included to "goods, wares and merchandise." It also added the
two following important sections:
"Sec. 4. . . . That whosoever shall wilfully and
knowingly purchase in blocks goods, wares or merchandise,
unpaid for by the seller, without exacting from said seller a
written statement sworn to, showing that said goods, wares
or merchandise have been paid for, shall be guilty of a mis-
demeanor.
"Sec. 5. . That the failure of the vendor un-
der sections I, 2, and 3 to pay over to his vendor or vendors
the price of such goods, wares or merchandise in proportion
to their claims or to return the same; and the failure of the
purchaser under section 4 to exact a signed sworn statement
from the seller required in said section, shall be such prima
facie evidence of fraudulent intent within the meaning of
this act as to warrant both criminal and civil proceedings." 3"
The National Association of Credit Men was organized at
Toledo, Ohio, in 1896, the New Orleans Credit Men's Asso-
ciation being a vigorous promoter of the convention at which the
national body was formed.3" The first few years of the new asso-
ciation's history were occupied largely with the effort to have
14 Ibid.
'Acts of La. 1896, 137.
36 The Louisiana statute remained in this form until again amended in 1912.
Acts of La. 1912, 135. Section 4 then was changed to make the transfer "prima
facie fraudulent and void," unless the purchaser demanded an inventory of the
stock of goods from his vendor, together with a list of the vendor's creditors,
whom the vendee must notify five days before taking possession. Failure of the
purchaser to comply with section 4 made him accountable to these creditors for
all goods coming into his possession.
A new bulk sales law for Louisiana was signed by the governor, July 15,
1926. Acts of La. 1926, 464. This act was drafted along the lines of the
"model bill" prepared by the National Association of Credit Men. See MoNT-
GomERy, op. cit. supra note 2, at 66. See also Montgomery, Louisiana Bulk
Sales (1926) 28 CREDIT MONTHLY 28. Apparently the constitutionality of these
various Louisiana statutes was never questioned.
'Letter to the writer, May 16, 1928, from J. Harry Tregoe.
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Congress enact a federal bankruptcy law.38 However, as early
as 1897, a general interest in bulk sales legislation was aroused,3 P
and by 1902-03, when the first issues of the Bulletin of the Na-
tional Association of Credit Men were published, the following
paragraph appeared : 40
"With the bankruptcy question disposed of for the
present, the matter of the adoption of laws regulating sales
of stocks of goods in bulk is now the principal feature of the
legislative work before the national association. We are
pleased to report, even at this early period of the year, the
introduction of measures on this subject in the legislatures
of Massachusetts, Colorado, Indiana, Missouri, Alabama,
and Kansas."
Long before 1903, however, an intensive campaign had been
waged by the credit men through their local organizations, to
arouse public sentiment in favor of "bulk bills." "' The national
association at that time was not large, and even by 19o3 it had
only about thirty-five local branches and a total membership of
about four thousand.42 Wholesalers everywhere rallied in sup-
IsIbid.
"Ibid.
(Feb. 5, 1903) BULLETIN NATIONAL AssocIATION OF CREDIT MEN 3.
The following circular letter, sent out during the fight for a bulk sales
law for Georgia by the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce, is typical. (Sept. 5,
19o3) BULLETIN NATIONAL AsSOCIATION OF CREDIT MEN 4.
"Senate Bill No. 192. A Law for General Welfare.
Dear Sir:
Can we ask your favorable consideration of the above bill, whose purpose
is to prevent the fraudulent sales of merchandise stocks in bulk? We believe
it to be needful legislation for the following reasons: (I) The progressive citi-
zens of every community are found among its wholesale and retail merchants-
these need all the protection they can get; (2) The law has the endorsement of
all the commercial bodies in every town of the state; (3) It will protect the
honest trader who pays IOO cents from the competition of the dishonest in-
solvent traders who sell out 'to a friend,' settle for a small amount, and open
again with a stock whose cost looks like 30 cents; (4) It will give an additional
safeguard to all commercial transactions and add no little to the credit of small
dealers, which today is an equivalent of added capital; (5) It will inure to the
commercial interests of the state to have it become a law at this session.
Thanking you in advance for what you can do to give it this direction,
we are, Yours for Georgia,
Atlanta Chamber of Commerce.
J. K. Orr, President."
(July I, 1903) BUmLETIN NATIONAL AssocIATION OF CREDIT MEN 29.
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port of the bills. Some retailers, however, were more skeptical,
maintaining that the proposed laws were inimical to their inter-
ests, in that they placed unnecessary restrictions upon the honest
merchant who wished to sell his business. The credit men an-
swered this argument by appealing to the financial self-interest
of the retailers. Suppose, contended the credit men, that "a dis-
honest debtor, with the intention of defrauding creditors, trans-
fers his stock to an accomplice. The latter offers it to the con-
sumer at ruinous prices 'to close,' and the honest debtor must meet
the competition or lose numerous sales which he otherwise would
-have effected at a profit. After an experience of this kind, the
dealer invariably becomes an earnest advocate of bulk sales
laws." 43 Then, too, as one newspaper pointed out in its editorial
column,44 the wholesaler was bound to lose money when a re-
tailer, to whom he had sold goods, disposed of his stock in bulk
and left the state without paying his creditors. This loss had to
be distributed. And so future wholesale prices to honest mer-
chants would be raised in proportion.
The legislative committee of the National Association of
Credit Men meanwhile drafted model "bulk bills" and had these
introduced into the several state legislatures. As the states, one
by one, passed these measures, the question soon arose as to the
constitutionality of such enactments. Invariably, the credit men
would appear through their attorneys and would ask leave of the
court to file a brief setting out the arguments in support of this
type of legislation. As will be indicated at a later point, where
the constitutional history of several state bulk sales statutes will
be considered, it was often necessary to raise funds of consider-
able size to finance these appeals.
Publicity was the outstanding feature of the credit men's
campaign. Whenever a state enacted a bulk sales law the legisla-
tive committee of the National Association of Credit Men would
print the text of the statute and distribute it widely. As the
court decisions sustaining the constitutionality of these laws were
' (Oct. 15, 19o6) ibid. 29.
"Sioux City, Iowa, Journal, as quoted in (May I5, igog) BULLETIN NA-
TIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CREDIT MEN 259.
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pronounced, a copy of the judge's opinion would be added to the
text of the enactment. Gradually this information was collected
in pamphlet form, and at the New York convention of the Na-
tional Association of Credit Men, held in 19o4, the legislative
committee reported the distribution of five thousand copies of
this pamphlet.45 Leaflets for use in the various jurisdictions also
were prepared, and as the courts interpreted specific sections of
the act, this information would be included, as well as comment
by local counsel suggesting the proper method of proceeding.46
At the present time the only compilation of the various bulk sales
statutes, as enacted and as interpreted by the courts, is that of W.
Randolph Montgomery, counsel for the National Association of
Credit Men, entitled Laws and Decisions Applying to Sales in
Bulk, now in the second edition.
The "bulk bill" campaign of the National Association of
Credit Men first brought tangible results when Oregon 47 passed a
statute in 1899 "to regulate the purchase, sale and transfer of
goods, wares and merchandise in bulk." Minnesota 48 followed
during the same year, Maryland 49 the next year, and by the end
of 19O1 Wisconsin,50 Tennessee,5' Washington,52 Utah,55 and
Indiana 54 all had bulk sales laws. The first Ohio "' and the first
New York 56 bulk sales statutes were passed in 19o2. Then came
the "banner year," 19o3, with favorable legislative action in Cali-
fornia, 57  Colorado,5" Connecticut,
59  Delaware,60  Georgia, 61
(July 1, 1904) ibid. 79.
"(I916) ibid. 126.
'7 Laws of Ore. i899, 248.
"Laws of Minn. i899, 357.
"Laws of Md. Igoo, 9o7.
t Laws of Wis. i901, 684.
'Laws of Tenn. 1901, 234.
r' Laws of Wash. 1901, 224.
' Laws of Utah i9o, 67.
'Laws of Ind. 1901, 505.
Laws of Ohio i9O2, 96.
"Laws of N. Y. 19o2, z249.
"CAL CIV. CODE (Io9) §344o, as amended by Stat. I93, iiI.
'Session Laws of Colo. 1903, 225.
'Pub. Acts of C6nn. 1903, 49.
'Laws of Del. i9o3, 748.
' 1Laws of Ga. 1903, 92.
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Idaho,62 Massachusetts, 63 and Oklahoma, 4 and with an amend-
ment to the Indiana act.65 The next half-dozen years saw a bulk
sales law on the statute books of every American state and of the
District of Columbia.
66
With the exception of the Connecticut act, which merely pro-
hibited the sale of a stock in bulk without prior recording of the
property transferred in the town clerk's office, and the California
act, which required similar registration with the county recorder,
these early statutes were not dissimilar as to general provisions.
All set out specific conditions to be fulfilled by both purchaser and
seller before the consummation of the sale. The original Oregon
act placed upon the vendee the duty of demanding from his vendor
a list of the latter's creditors with the amount owing each. A
vendor who knowingly made a materially false statement con-
cerning the transaction, or who failed to include the names of all
his creditors, was to be deemed guilty of perjury. The Minne-
sota act followed generally the wording later to become known
as the "New York form," and provided that if a sale in bulk was
made without complying with its terms, the transaction "shall be
presumed fraudulent and void." This was the clause--describ-
ing the effect of non-compliance-in which the legislatures dif-
fered most. In fact, so varied was the wording of the several
enactments, that the Minnesota court, in Thorpe v.-Pennock Mer-
cantile Co.,67 found it necessary to set out these "legal effect"
provisions in all acts passed prior to 19o6, before it could decide
finally that the Minnesota provision merely prescribed a rule of
evidence.
The campaign of the credit men in these various states which
had enacted bulk sales laws furnishes many interesting sidelights
on the methods used in procuring desired legislation. In Cali-
fornia the San Francisco and the Los Angeles associations of
" Session Laws of Idaho 19o3, II.
'Acts and Resolves of Mass. 1903, 389.
6 Session Laws of Okla. 1903, 249.
'Laws of Ind. 1903, 276.
'For a complete list of the statutes passed prior to 19o6 see Thorpe v.
Pennock Mercantile Co., 99 Minn. 22, 27, io8 N. W. 94o, 941, 942 (19o6).
"Ibid.
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credit men, both powerful groups, stirred their respective mem-
berships into active participation in the "drive" on the legislature.
The bill was introduced into the upper house by Senator E. I.
Wolfe, at the request of the San Francisco association, and upon
passage, was signed by Governor George C. Pardee on March io,
19o3.68 The Portland Association of Credit Men, another com-
mercial body possessing wide influence in the Northwest, after
bringing about the enactment of the Oregon statute in 1899, turned
its attention to surrounding states and sponsored the bill passed
by the Idaho legislature in 1903.69
In the Rocky Mountain territory the Denver Credit Men's
Association devoted numerous meetings to devising ways and
means for obtaining a bulk sales law for Colorado.70  One bill
passed both houses of the legislature, but was vetoed by the gov-
ernor because of "constitutional defects." A second bill failed of
passage by one vote. Eventually, however, Senate Bill No. 25,
introduced by Senator Charles D. Griffith, former president of
the Denver Association and delegate to several national credit
conventions, passed both houses. 71 It was approved by the gov-
ernor February 26, 1903.
In the East,72 one of the most active local groups sponsoring
bulk sales legislation was the Boston Credit Men's Association.
After an unsuccessful attempt to have the "bulk bill" passed at
the 19o2 session of the Massachusetts General Court,7 the Bos-
ton credit men concentrated their efforts on the session of 19o3.
While the "bulk bill' was pending in the senate, a Boston dealer
in "second-hand" stocks, named Raymond, made a vigorous at-
tempt to defeat it. Failing in this, Raymond charged that cer-
tain senators had been improperly influenced by the credit men
(March 5, 19o3) BULLETIN NATIONAl. AssocIATION OF CREDIT MEN 29;
(April 5, 1903) ibid.
(March 5, i9O3) ibid. 29.
° Ibid.
(Nov. 5, i9o2) ibid.; (Feb. 5, x9o3) ibid. 12.
"The Delaware act, signed by the governor, March 24, 1903, was intro-
duced into the legislature at the instance of W. J. McMannis, a member of the
National Association of Credit Men, who represented Delaware on the associa-
tion's legislative committee. (Apr. 5, 1903) BULLETIN NATIONAL AssocIATIoN
OF CREDIT MEN 2.
" (Nov. 5, 19o3) BULLETIN NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CREDIT MEN I8.
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into supporting the bulk sales statute. These charges were made
the basis of an investigation, in the course of which President
John R. Ainsley, and other members of the Boston Credit Men's
Association, were called to testify before a committee. "The re-
sult of the investigation was a complete refutation (of the
charges) made by the person Raymond." 74 The "bulk bill"
passed both houses and was approved by the governor. 5 Two
years later the Boston Credit Men's Association gave valuable
assistance in the campaign leading up to the passing of the Maine
act, which became operative July I, 1905.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF BULK SALES LEGISLATION
Questions concerning the constitutionality of bulk sales
laws were raised early. The Tennessee and the Washington
acts each reached their respective state supreme courts in 19o2.
The Tennessee act was tested in Ness v. Borches,7 16 which grew
out of a writ of replevin for sixty-seven pairs of shoes, valued at
sixty-seven dollars. Driscoll & Co., the vendors, were retail mer-
chants at Given, Tenn., who owed debts both to Borches & Co.
of Knoxville and Donaldson Bros. of Morristown. Borches &
Co. demanded payment, and not receiving it, "proceeded to buy
from Heritage, the clerk of Driscoll & Co., the entire stock of
Driscoll & Co., except a few odds and ends of no material value."
This was done without any notice by either the seller or pur-
chaser to the creditors of Driscoll & Co., as required by the Ten-
nessee act. It did not appear that there was any fraud in the
transaction, nor that it was contrary to the wishes of the firm.
Donaldson Bros. heard of the transfer and attached the shoes.
Borches & Co. replevied them. The trial court held the Tenizes-
see Bulk Sales Law unconstitutional and ruled that Driscoll &
Co. had made a valid sale.
7, (June 5, 19o3) BuLLETIN NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CREDIT MEN 3.
The Supreme Judicial Court sustained the Bulk Sales Law in Squire v.
Tellier, 185 Mass. 18, 69 N. E. 312 (19o4). The Boston Credit Men's Associa-
tion was permitted by the court to enter a brief prepared by Messrs. Pillsbury
and Morgan, counsel for the association. (Feb. 5, 1904) BULLETIN NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF CREDIT MEN I.
76 iog Tenn. 398, 71 S. W. 50 (1902).
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The Tennessee act followed closely the plan of the Minne-
sota statute. It provided that a sale made in violation of its terms
should be "presumed to be fraudulent and void." The majority
of the Supreme Court, in a brief opinion, held the act constitu-
tional, declaring,
77
"that it was intended to prevent the practice of fraudu-
lently selling out goods to the injury of creditors by mer-
chants; that it is merely a regulation of the business of mer-
chandising; that it is not class legislation, and that the limi-
tation of the act to merchants is not arbitrary classification;
that it does nbt take away the property of the citizen, but
only regulates the sale of merchandise in such manner as to
prevent fraud."
Mr. Justice Wilkes, in a dissenting opinion, branded the Bulk
Sales Law as "vicious class legislation," which, by restricting the
free sale and disposition of stocks of goods, deprived the mer-
chant of his property without due process of law.
The Washington act came before the state Supreme Court in
McDaniels v. I. I. Connelly Shoe Co.78  The issue arose out of a
writ of garnishment by an assignee of the creditor of the vendor,
sued out against the vendee who had purchased the stock in bulk
without complying with the provisions of the new Bulk Sales
Law. The Superior Court of Pierce County dismissed the writ.
Realizing that this was one of their first test cases, the Mer-
chants' Association of Seattle, suppotted by the National Asso-
ciation of Credit Men, financed the plaintiff's appeal to the Su-
preme Court. In order to carry up this case, a fund was collected
from various local branches of the National Association of Credit
Men.7
'
The Washington statute differed from that of Tennessee in
several particulars. The first section required that the purchaser,
before paying for the stock of goods, demand a list of the
vendor's creditors, with their addresses and the amount owing
each, this information to be verified according to the form set
1 Ibid. 402, 7, S. W. at 51.
" 3o Wash. 549, 71 Pac. 37, 6o L. R. A. 947 (i9o2).
" (Feb. 5, 19o3) Buu.rlN NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CREDIT MEN 3
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out in the statute. The second section stipulated that the sale
should be deemed "fraudulent and void" unless the vendee re-
ceived this list, and unless he either paid these creditors himself,
or saw to it that the vendor paid them out of the purchase money.
A third section resembled the Oregon statute by making a false
statement, in the information furnished by the vendor, an act of
perjury.
Judge Fullerton, speaking for the court, held the act consti-
tutional, declaring that the limitations placed upon the transfer of
property by merchants were within the police power, and were
not without precedent. The placing of merchants in a separate
category, in regard to the operation of the act, was held to be a
reasonable classification. And the act did not operate in restraint
of trade, as it prevented no one from transferring his stock in the
ordinary course of business. Whether the specific statute in ques-
tion was too harsh was not for the court to decide, Judge Fuller-
ton concluded. 80
The proponents of bulk sales legislation met their first re-
versal on constitutional grounds in 19o4, when the Utah Supreme
Court construed the Statute of 19Ol, modelled after the "New
York form." 81 This statute declared that any transfer of a stock
in bulk, made without complying with its terms, should be consid-
ered "fraudulent and void," and that those participating in the
same should be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, for which a
penalty was provided. In holding the Act of 19O1 unconstitutional,
the court relied on the stock arguments of the day. Liberty, as
that term is used in both the United States and the Utah Consti-
tutions, includes the "right in each subject to purchase, hold, and
sell or dispose of property in the same way that his neighbor may;
and of such liberties no one can be deprived without due process
of law." 82 This act deprived a merchant owing debts of his
power to contract in respect to the sale of his stock in trade. It
'The Tennessee and Washington decisions were regarded by the credit
men as great victories. Early in 19o3 some effort was made to repeal the Bulk
Sales Law of the former state. "The attack was sharply met by the Nashville
and Memphis associations and the effort at repeal was quickly abandoned."
(May 5, 19o3) BuLLETIN NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CREDmI MEN I8.
'Block v. Schwartz, 27 Utah 387, 76 Pac. 22, 65 L. R. A. 308 (I04).
'Ibid. 396, 76 Pac. at 25.
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did not aim to touch like contracts made by merchants not owing
debts. Therefore, not only was the former group deprived of
their property without due process of law, but the act created an
arbitrary and prohibited classification even within the business of
retailing. The court also considered the bulk sales statutes of
other jurisdictions which had been declared constitutional and
declared that none of these made failure to comply with their
provisions a misdemeanor. Furthermore, the Utah act likewise
failed to exempt from its operations officers acting in a fiduciary
capacity, or under judicial process.8
3
The Utah Statute of igoi was amended in 1905 84 and
modelled after the "Pennsylvania form," 85 which includes in the
text the form of statement concerning his creditors to which the
vendor must make affidavit. A section similar to that in the
Oregon statute was drafted, which makes a wilful false state-
ment by the vendor an act of perjury. The "misdemeanor
clause" was dropped and a new section added exempting fiduciary
and judicial officers from the operation of the act, thus eliminat-
ing some of the most objectionable features pointed out by the
court in Block v. Schwartz. Up to the present time the Supreme
Court of Utah has not passed on the constitutionality of the
amended act.
Constitutional difficulties were encountered also in Indiana
when suits were brought under the Bulk Sales Law of 19o1.
This statute was modelled after the "New York form" and de-
clared that transfers made in violation of its provisions should be
deemed "fraudulent and void" as against the creditors of the
seller. In Sellers v. Hayes 8 6 the Indiana Supreme Court inti-
mated that it considered the act unconstitutional. Meanwhile,
the Indianapolis credit men introduced into the legislature a
measure "for the purpose of strengthening the present Indiana
'The "misdemeanor clause" and the omission from the act of provisions
exempting fiduciary and judicial officers from its operations caused the Idaho
court to conclude in Boise Assn. of Credit Men v. Ellis, 26 Idaho 438, i44 Pac. 6
(i94), that: "it is not probable that a law with such drastic and unreasonable
provisions as the Utah statute had would ever be sustained by any court."
"Laws of Utah 19o5, 1O3.
' MONTGOIFMRY, op. cit. mipra note 2, at 15.
"163 Ind. 422, 72 N. E. ii9 (904).
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statute on the regulation of sales of stocks of goods in bulk." 87
This bill became the Act of March 9, 1903,8 containing much
more elaborate provisions than did its predecessor. In McKinster
v. Sager 8 9 the Indiana Supreme Court declared the Act of 1903
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment, in that, as all
creditors of the merchant were excluded except merchandise
ones-and these given a superior lien on the goods-this classifi-
cation was too narrow. Six years later, in 19o9, the Indiana leg-
islature passed a third Bulk Sales Law,90 a "substantial copy" of
the Michigan Act of 1905,91 which had been held constitutional
by the United States Supreme Court in Kidd, Dater & Price
Co. v. Musselzman Grocer Co.92 This Act of 19o9 came before
the Indiana Supreme Court in Hirth-Krause Co. v. Cohen,9- and
was held constitutional. The new act included all creditors of
the merchant-a provision which eliminated one of the prior
objections to the Act of 1903. Besides, the Indiana court admit-
ted frankly that the judicial trend of the times clearly favored
bulk sales legislation.
The constitutional history of bulk sales legislation in Illinois
is similar to that of Indiana. The original Bulk Sales Statute was
passed in 19o5 . 4 It followed the "New York form," and limited
the transfers within its scope to "an entire stock of merchandise
in gross." The Illinois Supreme Court, through Mr. Justice
Vickers, in Off & Co. v. Morehead,95 construed "stock of mer-
chandise" as meaning "stock in trade" and objected to this nar-
row classification of the act, maintaining that there was no spe-
cial reason why the creditors of merchants should be singled out
and protected while the creditors of manufacturers, hotel keepers,
8 (Feb. 5, I9O3) BULLETIN NATIONAL AssocIATIoN OF CREDIT MEN 3.
Laws of Ind. I9O3, 276.
163 Ind. 671, 72 N. E. 854 (1904).
Laws of Ind. 19o9, 122.
"Mich. Pub. Acts 1905, 322.
"217 U. S. 461, 3o Sup. Ct. 6o6 (igIo). In this case the United States
Supreme Court followed its previous ruling in Lemieux v. Young, 211 U. S.
489, 29 Sup. Ct.- 174 (igog), which held the Connecticut Bulk Sales Law consti-
tutional.
O177 Ind. I, 97 N. E. I (I912).
"Laws of III. I'O0, 285.
0 235 Ill. 40, 85 N. E. 264 (I9O8).
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livery stable proprietors, publishers, and those in other businesses
should be deprived of the advantages of the statute. Accord-
ingly, the court held the act unconstitutional, as violating sec-
tions i and 2 of the Illinois Bill of Rights.
In 1913 the Illinois statute was amended,9" and made mich
broader in scope. To the phrase "stock of merchandise" were
added the words "or merchandise and fixtures or other goods and
chattels of the vendor's business." A wilful false statement by
the vendor to the vendee concerning the number of his creditors,
or the condition of their accounts, was made a misdemeanor.
Another added section exempted from the operation of the act
sales by fiduciaries and by judicial officers, as well as public auc-
tions advertised at least ten days in advance.
Mr. Justice Vickers again wrote the opinion of the court
when this amended Statute of 1913 came up for interpretation in
Johnson Co. v. Beloosky. 97  He reviewed his previous opinion,
and then stated that the legislature obviously had attempted to
mould a statute to meet the objections pointed out by the court in
the Off & Co. case. In this task it had succeeded, and the new
act, since it applied to other transfers than those involving stocks
of merchandise, was a valid exercise of the police power. "The
reasonableness of the act and the necessity for its enactment are
legislative questions, with which the courts have no concern,"
he concluded.
The two jurisdictions in which bulk sales legislation had its
hardest battles were New York and Ohio. Both states passed
their first acts in 19o2. The New York statute reached the Court
of Appeals three years later in the leading case of Wright v.
Hart. s  The act was in the "New York form," 99 then most
"Laws of Ill. 1913, 258.
'7263 Ill. 363, 105 N. E. 287 (1914).
e182 N. Y. 330, 35 N. E. 404 (19o).
'The New York act provided: Every sale "of any portion of a stock of
merchandise, other than in the ordinary course of trade in the regular and usual
prosecution of the seller's business, or the sale of an entire stock of merchandise
in bulk, shall be fraudulent and void as against the creditors of the seller, un-
less the seller and purchaser shall at least five days before the sale, make a full
and detailed inventory,. showing the quantity, and so far as possible with the
exercise of reasonable diligence, the cost price to the seller of each article to be
included in the sale, and unless such purchaser shall at least five days before
the sale in good faith make full, explicit inquiry of the seller as to the name
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prevalent, and was held unconstitutional by a four to three deci-
sion, Werner, J., writing the opinion for the majority. The at-
tack on the statute was based on sections 1 100 and 6 101 of article
i of the state constitution and Article i of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution. The defense of the
statute, which placed certain restraints upon liberty and property,
was founded, said the court, on "that shibboleth of legislatures
and courts known as the police power." 102
Judge Werner analyzed the Bulk Sales Law in its most mi-
nute detail, rendering by far the most comprehensive opinion ever
attempted by any opponent of this type of legislation. The law
impaired freedom of contract, he said, because it would result in
"practically placing an embargo upon all sales of merchandise in
bulk." 10 1 It was class legislation. If the term "merchandise"
were given its ordinary business significance, then the act singled
out merchants only, and imposed burdens upon them. If "mer-
chandise" were given a broader interpretation, then like burdens
were imposed on a class including manufacturers, jobbers, and
wholesale merchants. The statute failed to distinguish between
honest and fraudulent sales. The five-day waiting period pro-
vided might kill a sale on a fluctuating market. The seller might
not care to disclose to the buyer the "cost price" of each article,
and, besides, "every paper of pins or fine tooth comb would have
to be inventoried." 104 In regard to the required notification to
creditors, in some cases "the inventory" might have to be dupli-
and place of residence or place of business of each and every creditor of the
seller, and the amount owing each creditor, and unless the purchaser shall at
least five days before the sale in good faith notify or cause to be notified per-
sonally or by registered mail each of the seller's creditors of whom the pur-
chaser has knowledge, or can with the exercise of reasonable diligence acquire
knowledge of such proposed sale, and of the stated cost price of merchandise to
be sold, and of the price to be paid therefore by the purchaser. The seller shall
at least five days before such sale file a truthful answer in writing to each and
all of said inquiries."
Providing that "no member of this state shall be . . . deprived of any
rights or privileges secured to any citizen thereof, unless by the law of the land
or the judgment of his peers."
Providing that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law."
20 Supra note 98, at 335, 75 N. E. at 4o6.
2' Ibid.
I" Ibid. 340, 75 N. E. at 407.
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cated by the hundreds or thousands and sent to creditors scattered
over all portions of the globe." 105
Near the close of his opinion, Judge Werner paid his re-
spects to the bulk sales law campaign conducted by the credit men,
in the following language: 106
"It is said that similar statutes, some of them much
more drastic, have been adopted in twenty different states or
jurisdictions. Twenty wrongs can never make one right.
There is, moreover, a singular, not to say suspicious, coinci-
dence in the time and substance of all this legislation. We
are indebted to our brother Bartlett for the suggestion that
more than half of these statutes were enacted in 1903 and
19o4, and nearly all of them since 19oo. Statutes that are
passed pro bonzo publico rarely sweep the country with such
irresistable momentum, while much fantastic legislation has
resulted from organized crusades upon legislatures by the
advocates and supporters of special classes."
Vann, J., wrote the principal dissenting opinion, in which he
stressed the need for bulk sales legislation "to suppress a wide-
spread evil, well known to current history and condemned by re-
peated adjudications of this court and all the leading courts of
the state from time out of mind." 107
The 'first New York statute was amended in I9o4.108 The
words "fraudulent and void" were changed to "will be presumed
to be fraudulent and void," and in Sprintz v. Saxton 10 9 the Ap-
pellate Division, Second Department, declared the act constitu-
tional. In 1907 110 a third statute was passed, similar in sub-
stance to the Act of 19o4. Again in 1914 111 the law was changed
still further and the present New York statute enacted.
As the Act of 1914 was substantially the same as the Act of
19o2, declared unconstitutional in Wright v. Hart, it is of inter-
est to follow its history somewhat in detail. The Supreme Court
Ibid.
Ibid. 345, 75 N. E. at 408.
Ibid. 346, 75 N. E. at 410.
'"Laws of 1904, c. 569. See (x116) 2 CoRx. L. Q. 28.
126 App. Div. 421, iio N. Y. Supp. 585 (1908).
"'Laws of 1907, C. 722.
PFRSONAL PROP. LAW, C. 722.
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of New York County in Apex Leasing Co. v. Litke 112 held the
act constitutional. The Supreme Court of King's County in
Klein v. Maravelas "13 held the act unconstitutional, and this de-
cision was affirmed by the Appellate Division, Second Depart-
ment, sitting in Brooklyn. 14 At this stage of the proceedings the
New York Credit Men's Association joined with the National
Association of Credit Men, and with the local associations in Al-
bany, Utica, Rochester, Syracuse, and Buffalo, and retained
Julian A. Gregory of New York City as counsel. When an ap-
peal was taken in Klein v. Maravelas, Mr. Gregory procured an
order from the Court of Appeals, allowing the credit men to inter-
vene and file a brief in their own behalf. This case came before
the Court of Appeals in i9i6,1" Judge Cardozo writing the opin-
ion. The court frankly overruled Wright v. Hart, and pointed
out that its doctrine, enunciated in 19o5, no longer met the com-
mercial needs of eleven years thereafter: 116
"The unanimous or all but unanimous voice of the
judges of the land in federal and state courts alike has up-
held the constitutionality of these laws. At the time of our
decision in Wright v. Hart such laws were thought new
and strange. They were thought in the prevailing opinion
to represent the fitful prejudices of the hour. The fact is
that they have come to stay and like laws may be found on
the statute books of every state. . . . Back of this
legislation, which to a majority of the judges who decided
Wright v. Hart seemed arbitrary and purposeless, there must
have been a real need. We can see this now, even though it
may have been obscure before. Our past decision ought not
to stand in opposition to the uniform convictions of the en-
tire judiciary of the land." 117
U193 Misc. 353, 158 N. Y. Supp. 21 (xgs6), rev'd on other grounds, 173
App. Div. 323, 159, N. Y. SupP. 707 (i6), aff'd, 225 N. Y. 625, 121 N. E. 853
(sgx8).
3294 Misc. 458, x59 N. Y. Supp. 554 (igx6).
54 173 App. Div. 983 (x916).
'21g N. Y. 383, 114 N. E. 8og (1916).
m lbid. 385, 114 N. E. at 81o.
m In order to bring the mortgage of a stock of merchandise in bulk under
provisions similar to those governing sales in bulk, § 230 (a) of the N-w YogiR
LiE LAW was enacted.
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The first Ohio Bulk Sales Statute," s which made transfers
of stocks in violation of its provisions "fraudulent and void," was
declared unconstitutional in Miller v. Crawford.119 Mr. Justice
Shauk, who wrote the opinion, reasoned that as section 19 of the
Ohio Bill of Rights provided that "private property shall ever be
held inviolate but subservient to the public welfare," only a "sub-
stantial reason of a public character" 120 would justify a restric-
tion upon the enjoyment and use of property. No such reason
existed here, he contended, for "under the guise of preventing
frauds," 121 in sales of stocks in bulk, this act prohibited them
altogether, as it was virtually impossible for the buyer to comply
with the requirements of the statute.
The second Ohio Bulk Sales Statute was passed April 3o,
19o8.122 This act said that a transfer made in violation of its
requirements should be "presumed to be made with the intent to
hinder, delay, or defraud creditors." Provision also was made
for a recording of the proposed sale in the office of the county
recorder not less than seven days prior to the transfer. In spite
of these changes, the Act of 19o8 was likewise held unconstitu-
tional in Williams & Thomas v. Preslo,'2" the Ohio Supreme
Court (again through Mr. Justice Shauk) maintaining that there
was no fundamental difference between the Statute of 19o2 and
that of 19o8.
Ohio held a constitutional convention in April, 1912. Long
before the opening date of the convention the credit men of the
state were busy. Early in the year the five Ohio associations of
credit men sent delegates to a joint meeting called at Columbus.
An account of the proceedings of this session reads: 124
"On this occasion Max Silberberg, representing the Cin-
cinnati association, presented a report drafted by him and
Henry Bentley, former secretary of the Cincinnati associa-
' Laws of Ohio 19o2, 96.
27O Ohio St. 207, 71 N. E. 631 (19o4).
2Ibid. 215, 71 N. E. at 632.
'Ibid. 217, 71 N. E. at 633.
OIo Ray. STAT. §§ 6343, 6344:
84 Ohio St. 328, 95 N. E. goo (1911).
(Feb. 1912) BuLLETIN NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CREIT MEN 114.
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tion, which received the approval of the state Board of Leg-
islation. The report outlines the part which it seemed should
be taken by the credit men's associations of Ohio at the con-
stitutional convention. It brings out the part taken by the
Cincinnati association in selecting the representatives to the
convention to be placed on a non-partisan ticket, and how
that organization had been instrumental in the election of
eight out of nine candidates. .
This report was devoted principally to considering the prob-
lem of framing an amendment to the Ohio constitution which
would empower the legislature to pass a valid bulk sales law.
The committee concluded, after analyzing the previous Ohio bulk
sales decisions, that "any attempt to change the Constitution
through the new convention by striking out Section 19 of Article
i would be futile." 125 Instead, the committee advised a program
of education for the Ohio courts in "the vital needs of modern
business" and suggested that "associations of credit men through-
out the state should invite during the coming year the judges of
the Supreme Court to be present at their meetings and to get
in touch with the association's work, get a knowledge of their
high standing, the ideals and aims of the organizations, and get
into close sympathy with the fight on the part of the business
men against fraud." 126
That the constitutional convention felt there was a real need
for bulk sales legislation in Ohio, is evidenced by the fact that
when the new constitution was adopted, September 3, 1912, an
amendment legalizing such a statute was included. This re-
sult was obtained in section 2 of article XIII. Clause i of this
section treated of certain powers over corporations granted to
the legislature. Clause 2 of the same section provided:
"Laws may be passed regulating the sale and convey-
ance of other personal property, whether owned by a corpo-




Acting under the authority of clause 2, the Ohio legislature,
in 1913, passed a third Bulk Sales Law, identical in form with
the present New York statute.
1 27
Cases soon arose under the new act. In the Common Pleas
Court of Montgomery County, the statute was held constitutional.
In the Common Pleas Court of Clarke County, it was held uncon-
stitutional. The Clarke County case was affirmed by the Circuit
Court of Appeals and this decision was carried to the Supreme
Court of Ohio for final adjudication,128 the Ohio Wholesale Gro-
cers Association joining forces with the credit men and employ-
ing George B. Okey of Columbus as chief counsel. 129 Their
united efforts met with success, for in Steele, Hopkins & Mere-
dith Co. v. Miller/,' the Ohio Supreme Court held the Act of
1913 constitutional.
Johnson, J., in writing the opinion, pointed out the rapid
growth of credit transactions in the retail merchandising busi-
ness. This condition, he said, gave an opportunity for fraud on
creditor wholesalers, "not usual in other forms of business." The
court also called attention to the debates of the members who
drew the constitutional amendment. It was the general under-
standing of the framers of the amendment that-in the words of
a leading member of the convention-it "has met the condition
which the Supreme Court of Ohio has declared to exist, and un-
fetters the legislature so that it can pass this needed legislation."
Therefore, the amendment and the Bill of Rights must be con-
strued together. Neither does the new Btdk Sales Law violate
the Federal Constitution. The classification is reasonable and the
statute is justifiable legislation under the police power.
CONCLUSION
This discussion has sought to describe: (i) the extent to
which, prior to the passage of bulk sales laws, the common law
courts aided the creditors of a merchant who disposed of his stock
IOO GEN. CODE (Page, x926) § iiio2.
(Oct. 1914) BuLLETin NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CREDIT MEN 844.
'Ibid.
13092 Ohio St. 115, IiO N. E. 648 (I915).
I00 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
in bulk without paying his debts; (2) the effectiveness of the na-
tion-wide campaign waged by the National Association of Credit
Men to procure the enactment of bulk sales legislation; (3) the
task which faced the proponents of bulk sales laws when these
statutes were declared unconstitutional by the highest courts of
five jurisdictions, and the methods used by the credit men in ob-
taining changes in those laws to meet the objections raised by the
courts.
No attempt has been made to include within the scope of this
article a discussion of the construction of specific bulk sales stat-
utes. One of the major problems that has arisen in this connec-
tion is whether the words "stock of merchandise," or "goods,
wares, and merchandise" includes trade fixtures or other prop-
erty not kept for sale when the two latter are not mentioned spe-
cifically in the statute. The courts are not in agreement as to
the answer.lal Another stumbling block is the phrase "presumed
to be fraudulent and void" used in numerous bulk sales laws to
describe the legal effect of a transfer of a stock in gross, made
without complying with the terms of the act. One court would
make these words merely prescribe a rule of evidence.'7 2 Another
would construe them as "enacting a rule of substantive law, mak-
ing sales not in conformity to the statute, fraudulent as to credi-
tors as a matter of law." 1"P A third would hold that if no at-
tempt is made by the parties to comply with the statute, then the
sale is "unlawful and voidable," but "if the parties attempt to
comply with the statute, but fail in some particulars," such con-
duct is only presumptively fraudulent and may be overcome by
evidence proving good faith. 13
"Such diversity of construction" has led a commentator in
'For cases discussing this question see Sakelos v. Hutchinson Bros., 129
Md. 3oo, 99 Atl. 357 (1916) ; Kolander v. Dunn, 95 Minn. 422, 104 N. W. 371
(19o5); Swift v. Tempelos, 178 N. C. 487, 101 S. E. 8 (1919) ; Johnson v.
Kelly, 32 N. D. 116, 155 N. W. 683 (1915); Cressman v. Haas, 26 Pa. Dist. 812
(1917); Lewis, Hubbard & Co. v. Loughran, 85 W. Va. 235, IO S. E. 465
(1gig) ; Plass v. Morgan, 36 Wash. I6O, 78 Pac. 784 (I9o4).
I Thorpe v. Pennock Mercantile Co., supra note 66; Young v. Gordon, 257
Fed. 846 (E. D. N. Y. 1919) (construing previous New York statute).
' MONTOmERY, op. cil. supra note 2, citing William R. Moore Dry Goods
Co. v. Rowe, 99 Miss. 30, 54 So. 659 (1911).
' National City Bank v. Huey, etc., Drug Co., 113 S. C. 333, 102 S. E. 516
(1920).
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the Harvard Law Review to "the suspicion that there is little real
need for remedial statutes of this nature." 135 The National
Bankruptcy Act is cited as furnishing an adequate remedy in
providing "for a speedy discovery of assets and making a prefer-
ence by an insolvent debtor an act of bankruptcy and voidable."
Theoretically, these provisions may seem to furnish the merchan-
dise creditor ample protection. As a practical matter, the aver-
age credit man places these legal remedies in the same category
with those afforded to the owner of the proverbial stolen horse
who had forgotten to lock the barn door. What the credit man
desires most is not a legal remedy to be administered subsequent
to the sale of the debtor's assets, but notice in advance, of the
proposed transfer, such as a bulk sales statute provides. If this
notice is afforded him, the credit man is, from a business stand-
point at least, in a vastly better position than if the sale already
has taken place, although his debtor at the time of the transfer
may even have been technically insolvent under the Bankruptcy
Act. It is also true that many of the sales in bulk which do the
greatest damage to merchandise creditors are those made, not by
a debtor who is technically insolvent under the Bankruptcy Act,
but by one who merely is unable to meet his bills as they fall due.
With the latter class of debtors the Bankruptcy Act is not con-
cerned. And if the vendee purchased the stock in good faith, the
creditor, in the absence of statute, is without a remedy.
The facts set forth in this study confirm Dean Pound's as-
sertion that the existence of bulk sales legislation is due to the
"organized pressure" brought upon the legislatures by one eco-
nomic group-in this case a creditor group.131 This pressure ob-
tained almost immediate results in a score of widely scattered
jurisdictions, for the forces opposing bulk sales laws were unor-
ganized and soon put to flight. Nevertheless, as has been pointed
out, difficulties were encountered later, because some of the
judges, sitting during the opening years of the Twentieth Cen-
tury, felt that these "new and strange" statutes violated funda-
mental constitutional privileges. But these obstacles also were
(920) 33 HAV. L. REv. 717, 718.
iM POUND, 10c. Cit. supra note 12.
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overcome, as the trend of the times aided and abetted the organ..
ized efforts of the proponents of bulk sales laws.
However, that certain economic groups, because of self-
interest, foster particular types of legislation, is no reason, in it-
self, for condemning that legislation. Many of our statutory en-
actments, which are socially most desirable, have been adopted,
not because the legislature hearkened to the voice of the sover-
eign multitude raised spontaneously in behalf of its own welfare,
but because some organized group, for its own particular benefit,
had carried its carefully planned campaign into the legislative
halls.
Such has been the history of bulk sales legislation. It was
socially desirable. It was fostered by a highly organized unit-
the National Association of Credit Men. The wholesalers, be-
cause of practices prevalent among dishonest merchants, espe-
cially during the late nineties, placed a premium upon any exten-
sion of credit to a retailer, whether he were honest or dishonest.
The ultimate consumer eventually underwrote the wholesaler's
risk when the former settled his fortnightly account with "the
butcher, the baker and the candle-stick maker." Society at large,
as well as the credit man, needed some new legal remedy to curb
the then all-too-current practice of unannounced sales of entire
stocks of merchandise. The solution of the problem came with
the passage of those statutes which regulate the transfer of goods
in bulk.
